As the (Customs and Trade) World Turns: April 2026

Welcome to the April 2026 issue of “As the (Customs and Trade) World Turns,” our monthly newsletter where we compile essential updates from the customs and trade world over the past month. We bring you the most recent and significant insights in an accessible format, concluding with our main takeaways — aka “And the Fox Says…” — on what you need to know.

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We are navigating an unpredictable and fast-changing trade landscape and what we are reporting today may change by tomorrow (or in the next hour). However, our team is regularly issuing reports and alerts to help our clients and friends stay up to date. Sign up here for regular updates and to receive this newsletter each month. In addition, our Trump 2.0 Tariff Tracker can be found here and information regarding navigating the new tariffs can be found here.

This edition provides essential insights for sectors including international trade, national security, aluminum, steel, and copper industries, fashion and retail, automotive, life sciences, electronics, artificial intelligence, transportation, electric mobility, e-commerce, shipping and logistics, and compliance, as well as for in-house counsel, importers, and compliance professionals. 

IEEPA refunds are here! 

US Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Consolidated Administration and Processing of Entries (CAPE) tool officially launched on April 20 within the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), giving importers a streamlined portal to reclaim duties paid under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Phase 1 covers certain standard entries that are unliquidated or within 80 days of liquidation, and refunds will reportedly be issued within 60 to 90 days of an accepted CAPE Declaration.

Importers and their customs brokers should act promptly. Ensure your company has an active ACE importer account, set up ACH bank information for electronic refunds, and compile a list of eligible entries for submission. Keep in mind that once a CAPE Declaration is filed and accepted, it cannot be amended, so entries should be reviewed carefully for accuracy before submission (although rejected entries can be refiled). Entries excluded from Phase 1 will be addressed in subsequent phases. 

We will continue to monitor developments and provide updates as CBP expands the program.

In this April 2026 edition, we cover:

  1. CBP’s newly launched CAPE system to submit refund claims for IEEPA duties. 
  2. The new framework for Section 232 duties on steel and aluminum derivative products. 
  3. The uncertain regulatory landscape surrounding US AI chip exports.
  4. The legal battle over the global Section 122 duties at the CIT. 
  5. Recent Section 232 duties on pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients.
  6. Potential impact on US and Mexican exporters following the initiation of Canadian safeguard investigations. 
  7. Easing of Belarusian sanctions driven by external pressures on global oil and fertilizer suppliers. 
  8. Status of Section 301 investigations on structural excess capacity practices and alleged failures to impose forced labor bans.

1. The CAPEd Crusader: Customs’ New Refund System for IEEPA Tariffs

As expected, on April 20, CBP launched Phase 1 of the CAPE system. CAPE is the new automated refund platform within CBP’s ACE portal designed to streamline the processing of IEEPA tariff refunds. Only the list of entries associated with IEEPA payments must be submitted by the importer or broker that filed the underlying entry. CBP expects to take 45 days to review the CAPE declaration. Refunds are generally expected within 60 to 90 days following acceptance of a CAPE Declaration and can only be issued via ACH payment. Early reports, however, indicate that the portal experienced technical glitches on its launch day, with some users encountering error messages and system overloads due to high volume. We expect the technical issues to persist for at least a few days.

Importantly, CAPE Phase 1 is limited in scope. It will process certain unliquidated and liquidated entries that are no more than 80 days past their liquidation date, but will not process several types of entries, including entries that are subject to antidumping or countervailing duty orders for which the US Department of Commerce has issued liquidation instructions and that are pending liquidation, reconciliation, or open or suspended protests. 

CBP has indicated that entries that do not qualify for Phase 1 will be addressed in subsequent phases of CAPE. 

Importantly, importers should review their underlying entries for accuracy prior to submitting the CAPE declaration. The filer must attest to the following: 

I attest to the best of my knowledge and belief that: (1) the country of origin, entry type, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) classification(s), and valuation for each entry number is true and correct; and (2) the goods were not entered in violation of any applicable United States law, order, or rule. I understand that if I make or cause others to make material false statements or omissions to CBP, including in connection with a request for tariff reimbursement, I may be subject to criminal prosecution and civil liability, including but not limited to under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 542, 545, 19 USC § 1592, and 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 

We expect that the refund process may result in an increase in Customs compliance reviews.

And the Fox Says… Importers should continue to track entries on which they paid IEEPA tariffs and ensure that they are registered for ACH refunds in order to receive refunds. Importers and brokers should begin compiling lists of IEEPA-affected entry numbers and submit CAPE Declarations for eligible entries. Given early launch-day glitches, filers should exercise patience and verify submissions carefully. Finally, importers should continue to monitor liquidation dates and protest deadlines. Due to uncertainty as to how or when refunds will be issued for entries not eligible for Phase 1, it is advisable to file protests within 180 days of liquidation to preserve all available refund rights while Phase 2 development remains pending. 

Contributors: Tyler J. KimberlyMario A. TorricoNancy A. Noonan, and Angela M. Santos

2. Melted, Smelted, and Shaken Up: The New Section 232 Metals Framework

On April 2, President Trump issued a new proclamation that fundamentally restructures how Section 232 tariffs are assessed on steel, aluminum, copper, and their derivative products. The new provisions took effect on April 6. 

While the Administration characterized the overhaul as a simplification, in many ways the new tariff regime adds new layers of complexity. Among other changes, the proclamation establishes a tiered tariff structure organized across the four Annexes. Please refer to our full alert on the new Section 232 framework, here, for a breakdown of the new tiered structure. 

Full-Value Assessment Replaces Metal-Content Methodology 

The proclamation eliminates the prior metal “content” methodology, under which Section 232 tariffs on derivative products were assessed only on the value of the metal content. Now, Section 232 applies to the full customs value of the imported product. While this simplifies the duty calculation, it may significantly increase the duty exposure for products with relatively low metal content. Fortunately, for mixed products that have more than one metal content (e.g., copper and aluminum), the Section 232 duties on steel, aluminum, and copper tariffs do not stack with each other. Additionally, certain products outside of Chapters 72, 73, 74, and 76 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) are excluded from the duties set forth in Annexes I-B and III where the weight of the applicable metal is less than 15% of the total weight of the imported article.

US Melt and Pour No Longer a Full Exemption 

Under the prior framework, products made with US origin steel and aluminum, (i.e., steel melted and poured, or aluminum smelted and cast, in the United States) were fully exempt from Section 232 duties. The new framework replaces that complete exemption with a reduced 10% rate for derivative products containing at least 95% US origin metal (now including copper). This is a notable shift for a tariff regime designed to protest domestic metals production, as products containing US-sourced metals are now subject to a tariff that did not previously apply. 

And the Fox Says… Do not mistake simplification for savings. Full-value assessment will increase duty exposure for many derivative products, and the loss of the full US melt-and-pour and smelt-and-cast exemptions adds an unexpected cost for companies sourcing domestically. In addition, despite the prior metal-content methodology going away, CBP is still likely to scrutinize entries made under the prior framework (i.e., products entered before April 6), so importers should maintain audit-ready documentation supporting any historical metal-content calculations. 

Contributors: James KimMario A. Torrico, and Andrew McArthur 

3. Future of AI Chip Export Controls Remains Uncertain

Amidst conflicting signals from Washington, DC, and Beijing, the regulatory landscape for Nvidia and other US chip exporters remains uncertain. 

Last month, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) appeared poised to issue a much-anticipated rule imposing revamped export controls on artificial intelligence (AI) chips, only to withdraw the draft regulation at the last minute. Chip controls have been in limbo since BIS rescinded the Biden-era Framework for AI Diffusion in May 2025. Since then, the agency has not followed up with any action to revise the Export Administration Regulations, let alone issue a replacement rule. It is believed that the withdrawn rule would have established separate approval processes for license applications based on computing power levels, replacing the AI Diffusion rule’s country-based tier system. 

Meanwhile, Nvidia and other chip exporters have been caught in the crossfire of US-China relations. The company ramped up production of the H200 chip after President Trump indicated in December 2025 he would permit its sale to China. The process stalled when China restricted the import of H200s, even as BIS relaxed its licensing review policy for H200 exports to China. Then, in an apparent reversal in mid-March, Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang announced that the company had received purchase orders from Chinese customers and licenses from both the US and Chinese governments. 

At the center of all this turbulence is BIS itself. According to recent media reports, licensing bottlenecks, staffing attrition, and a lack of clear policy direction threaten to undermine the Trump Administration’s stated goal of boosting global sales of American AI chips. 

And the Fox Says… The whiplash of starts and stops underscores a broader reality: Without a coherent, durable regulatory framework, the US chip industry faces sustained uncertainty that complicates long-term planning for companies and customers alike. 

Contributors: Derek Ha and Kay C. Georgi

4. One Litigation After Another: CIT Hears Oral Arguments on the President’s Imposition of Global Tariffs Under Section 122 

On February 20, the same day the US Supreme Court struck down President Trump’s IEEPA tariffs, the president announced that he would use Section 122 of the 1974 Trade Act to impose a 10% tariff on most imports worldwide. Section 122, which had never previously been used to impose tariffs (sound familiar?), authorizes the president to impose “import surcharges” of up to 15% to address “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits.” These tariffs can remain in place for up to 150 days, unless extended by US Congress. We do not expect Congress to extend the tariffs given the midterm elections this year. The 10% Section 122 tariffs imposed by the president are set to expire on July 24. 

A coalition of 24 states led by Oregon and several importers filed suits in the US Court of International Trade (CIT) challenging the Section 122 tariffs as unlawful (State of Oregon v. Trump, CIT No. 26-01472; Burlap and Barrel v. Trump, CIT No. 26-01606). The plaintiffs argue that the president has mischaracterized trade deficits as “balance-of-payments deficits” and that the statute’s conditions have not been satisfied. 

At a hearing on April 10, the three-judge CIT panel repeatedly pressed the government’s attorney on whether the president’s reliance on the current trade deficit alone can satisfy the statute’s requirements for imposing the tariffs. The court’s questioning suggested a view that the term “balance-of-payment deficits” has a specific and fixed meaning tied to valuation and liquidity of US currency. Counsel for the private importers also urged the panel to apply the “major questions” doctrine at the hearing. 

And the Fox Says… Similar to the IEEPA tariff litigation, the CIT is expediting the briefing of this case. However, that is not necessarily an indication that the CIT will issue a decision on an expedited basis. In addition to the Section 122 tariffs, the Trump Administration has been aggressively pursuing other avenues (Section 301 and Section 232) to impose tariffs that will likely replace the IEEPA tariffs. Importers should continue to track the Section 122 tariffs paid in the event that they are invalidated by the court and refunds become available. 

Contributors: Tyler J. KimberlyFernando Ramírez, and Angela M. Santos

5. Section 232 Tariffs on Pharmaceuticals: What You Need to Know

On April 2, President Trump issued a proclamation imposing tariffs of up to 100% on patented pharmaceuticals and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Commerce Department investigation found that the United States is heavily reliant on imports of pharmaceuticals, approximately 53% of patented pharmaceutical products are produced abroad — threatening national security and access to life-saving medications. See our comprehensive alert for a full-length analysis. 

The proclamation creates the following tiered tariff rate system: 

  • The default rate is 100% on all imported patented pharmaceuticals and APIs, subject to the exceptions outlined below. 

  • Companies with Commerce-approved onshoring plans qualify for a 20% rate, escalating to 100% by April 2, 2030. 

  • Companies with an approved onshoring plan and that also execute Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) pharmaceutical pricing agreements with the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) enjoy a 0% rate until January 20, 2029. 

  • Trade-deal countries (EU, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein) face a 15% ad valorem duty rate; the UK faces a 10% rate, which may be reduced to zero under a future pharmaceutical pricing agreement. 

The new tariffs take effect July 31 for the 17 large companies listed in Annex III and September 29 for all others. 

Generic drugs, biosimilars, and their ingredients are exempt — for now — subject to reassessment within one year. Specialty products such as orphan drugs, cell and gene therapies, and nuclear medicines are also exempt if they are from trade-deal jurisdictions or meet urgent health needs. US-origin products are excluded as well. 

And the Fox Says… This is a landmark use of Section 232, beyond metals and autos, to reshape pharmaceutical supply chains through tariff leverage, particularly a tiered structure incentivizing onshore production. Companies should immediately review HTSUS classifications, evaluate onshoring and MFN pricing negotiations, and prepare for a compliance landscape with escalating stakes. Importers of pharmaceutical products should also evaluate whether they can adopt measures to mitigate the effects of these Section 232 actions. 

Contributors: Denny PeixotoTyler J. KimberlyLucas A. Rock, and James Kim

6. Canada Launches Global Safeguard Investigations Affecting Frozen Vegetables and Wood Products

In recent months, the Canadian government has initiated two global safeguard inquiries that could have significant implications for international exporters, including those from the United States and Mexico. These inquiries are notable, as Canada has conducted only six such proceedings in the past 25 years with limited successful outcomes for the domestic industry. 

The legal framework mirrors Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974. 

On March 16, the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) launched an inquiry into imports of certain frozen and canned vegetables. The Tribunal will assess whether rising import volumes are a principal cause of serious injury — or the threat thereof — to Canadian producers of comparable goods. If injury is determined, the CITT will recommend remedies to the government for up to three years. Uniquely, the Tribunal has been instructed to consider the impact of any measures on consumer affordability and food security as part of its analysis. 

On April 20, the Minister of Finance directed the CITT to examine imports of solid and engineered wood cabinets and vanities, hardwood flooring, and engineered wood storage furniture. In his announcement, the minister underscored the government’s commitment to safeguarding Canada’s forest sector, which supports nearly 200,000 workers and contributes more than $20 billion to the country’s GDP. 

Both inquiries require the CITT to issue recommendations within 270 days of initiation. 

No blanket exclusions apply for products from countries with free trade agreements, including United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement members. However, special rules exist for assessing injury to goods from certain Free Trade Agreement partners and for exports from less developed countries with preferential tariffs. 

And the Fox Says… With the CITT required to deliver its recommendations within a strict 270-day window, it is essential for affected exporters to quickly evaluate how these proceedings could impact their business and determine the most effective timing and manner for engagement. Additionally, because the Minister of Finance has the authority to accept, modify, or reject the CITT’s recommendations — and may weigh broader considerations such as consumer affordability and food security — exporters have a meaningful opportunity to provide input and influence the outcome even after the Tribunal issues its recommendations. Timely, strategic involvement throughout the process can significantly increase the chances of shaping both the procedural direction and the final remedies imposed. 

Contributor: Riyaz Dattu

7. The Trump Administration Eases Belarusian Sanctions to Relieve Pressure From the Middle East

The past year has underscored the Trump Administration’s willingness to deploy sanctions — both imposing and lifting them — as a central tool in its foreign policy arsenal. This includes the release of general licenses authorizing the sale of Venezuelan-origin oil (subject to certain conditions), as summarized in our previous alerts in JanuaryFebruary, and March

More recently, in the wake of global oil shortages following military actions in Iran, the Administration has turned its attention to other sanctions programs to ease pressure on oil and petrochemical supplies resulting from the closure of the Straits of Hormuz. In addition to short-term authorizations of transactions involving Russian and (more surprisingly) Iranian oil, which drew some criticism, on March 26, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took several steps to loosen the sanctions on Belarus, including removing from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List and a number of entities in the Belarusian fertilizer sector.

These changes followed joint talks between the United States and Belarus held in March, during which President Lukashenko agreed to release 250 political prisoners. Notably, however, the easing of restrictions on the fertilizer sector also responds to a global fertilizer shortage driven by the conflict in the Middle East, which has pushed fertilizer prices higher and increased costs for US farmers.

And the Fox Says… The removal of restrictions on Belarus is only one example of the Trump Administration leveraging sanctions as a foreign policy tool. As the Administration continues to pursue its foreign policy objectives, we anticipate that sanctions will continue to be used to both restrict and authorize certain transactions.

Contributors: Maya S. Cohen and Matthew Tuchband

8. USTR Prepares for Public Hearings in Section 301 Investigations 

On March 11 and 12, the US Trade Representative (USTR) launched two Section 301 investigations into several economies (see our alert here). The first investigation targets structural excess capacity and production practices within 16 economies, covering a broad range of manufacturing sectors including aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement, chemicals, electronics, energy goods, machinery, plastics, semiconductors, solar modules, steel, and transportation equipment. The excess capacity investigation focuses on government policies such as subsidies untethered from market demand, suppressed wages, state-owned enterprise activities, market access barriers, and lax labor and environmental protections. Key targets include China, the EU, and countries across Asia and Latin America.

The second investigation targets 60 different economies for alleged failures to enforce forced labor import prohibitions, a relatively novel application of Section 301 authority. The forced labor investigation examines whether targeted economies’ failure to implement or enforce forced labor bans is unreasonable and burdens US commerce.

As part of its investigations, the USTR requested written comments and requests to appear on the docket during the public hearings for both investigations, both of which were due on April 15. The USTR’s public hearings will allow interested parties to testify in front of the agency. 

Public Hearings

  • Excess Capacity: Public hearing begins May 5 with rebuttal comments due seven days after the hearing concludes.

  • Forced Labor: Public hearing begins on April 28 with rebuttal comments due seven days after the hearing concludes.

And the Fox Says… The Administration has repeatedly insisted that Section 301 will be used as a tool to impose tariffs at similar levels to those previously imposed under IEEPA. We expect the USTR to expedite its investigations under Section 301 to impose any tariffs as soon as possible. 

ArentFox Schiff drafted comments in the forced labor investigation on behalf of 17 associations spanning various industries and continues to monitor developments, as any USTR actions could impact most of the US’ major trading partners. Importers should map their exposure across supply chains touching any of the 16 (excess capacity) or 60 (forced labor) targeted economies and evaluate mitigation strategies. Companies should also review submitted comments and monitor investigation developments, as public input may shape the products, economies, and tariff levels ultimately targeted and imposed. Rebuttal comments can also impact the results of these investigations. 

Contributors: Collin M. DouglasLucas A. Rock, and Angela M. Santos

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